by Cass Sunstein

A great deal of social science research has recently been devoted to "the affect heuristic." (Paul Slovic is the pioneer here.) The basic idea is that people often have a rapid affective reaction to people, activities, processes, and ideas, and the affective reaction operates as a mental shortcut for a more sustained analysis. Consider nuclear power, genetically engineered foods, and cloning--in these and other cases, affective reactions play a large role in producing people's judgments. Some evidence in favor of the affect heuristic: People tend to think that activities with high benefits have low risks; they also tend to think that activities with high risks have low benefits. (Consider nuclear power.) And under time pressure, people show a greater inclination to think that high-benefit activities have low risks, and that high-risk activities have low benefits. The fact that the inclination to see high benefits/low risks, and high risks/low benefits, is greater under time pressure strongly suggests that a general affective reaction comes first, and helps orient judgments about both risks and benefits. There is a relationship between the operation of the affect heuristic and Malcolm Gladwell's emphasis on how much we can learn from a quick "blink." One difference is that those who explore the affect heuristic emphasize that the heuristic is error-prone. A rapid, affective reaction can lead people in pretty bad directions. That's a long wind-up for the pitch, which is this: The affect heuristic plays a massive role in campaigns. Many people have a rapid affective reaction to Hillary Clinton, and the reaction isn't terrifically favorable--even if they think, on reflection, that she would probably be a good president. In 2000 and 2004, the affect heuristic strongly favored President Bush, so that many people voted for him even though they disagreed with many of his proposed policies. There are many implications. People's after-the-fact accounts of why they voted for a candidate may not really be explanatory; their affective reaction may well have produced their votes. (Agreement or disagreement with policy judgments might be incidental.) All candidates have a strong interest in ensuring that the affect heuristic operates in their favor--and against their adversary. (Of course there is a separate task of identifying the sources of affect.) The most successful politicians have showed a strong intuitive understanding of these points: FDR and Ronald Reagan are the obvious examples.