by Cass Sunstein

After our little exchange on political grace (thanks to Richard Stern for the joke, which is quite illuminating), it might be worthwhile to think a bit about the idea of political charity, especially in the context of divided government. Three practices seem to constitute political charity. First, those who display political charity do not question the motives of those with whom they disagree. On the contrary, they cast those motives in the best possible light. (Consider imaginable discussions of the Iraq War or affirmative action.) Second, those who display political charity try to endorse the deepest moral commitments of those with whom they disagree. If they cannot endorse those commitments, at least they show respect for them. (Consider imaginable discussions of same-sex marriage and climate change.) Third, those who display political charity try for reforms and innovations that can be accepted by people who reject or even abhor what they take (fear?) to be the defining commitments of the reformers and innovators. That is, a central goal of those who display political charity is to obtain agreements on practices amidst disagreement or uncertainty about what, precisely, accounts for those practices. (Considerable imaginable discussions of increases in the minimum wage, energy independence, or health care reform.) Obviously, charity can be taken too far. When people's motives really are bad, it is fine and maybe obligatory to question them. Some moral commitments have to be ruled off-limits (consider the commitments of those who defended racial segregation or the subordination of women). But political charity, understood in these ways, is generally appropriate--and it can also be exceedingly useful. Paul Simon, the very liberal but widely beloved Illinois senator, was successful in large part because he was so charitable; Barack Obama's appeal lies more than a little bit in his unfailing sense of charity. Dan Kahan (at Yale Law School) and his collaborators have produced a series of provocative papers on "cultural cognition"--on the extent to which people's judgments about particular social and political issues are a product of their more general cultural commitments. One of their basic claims is that on diverse issues, it is possible to make progress, and to receive support from one's apparent adversaries, if a favored initiative can be shown to fit with, or follow from, their cultural commitments. (An example: Market-based strategies for reducing pollution, through which environmentalists have sometimes received the support, or dampened the opposition, of those suspicious of new environmental regulation. A more complicated example: President Clinton's suggestion that abortion should be safe, legal, and rare, with the word "rare" signalling respect for the beliefs of those who oppose abortion on moral grounds.) In the end, it would be self-defeating to defend political charity on the ground that it is a good strategy. Nonetheless, a nice byproduct of political charity is that it can benefit those who practice it.