Blind Date

is head of the Center for Strategic and Policy Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He served as head of the Mossad from 1998 to 2002, and he was national security adviser to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2002-2003. He is the author of Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man who Led the Mossad.As fighting between Israel and Hezbollah entered its third week, a senior Iranian representative named Ali Larijani arrived in Damascus, where he apparently talked with Syrian President Bashar Assad and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. A Kuwaiti newspaper reported that the aim of the meeting was to figure out how to keep supplying Hezbollah with Iranian arms. But my guess is that Larijani also carried a sobering message from his superiors in Tehran: The longer this fight drags on, the greater the risk to Iranian interests in the Middle East. Iran's president has publicly called for a cease-fire, and with good reason. Before Hezbollah attacked Israel, this summer was shaping up to be a promising geopolitical moment for Iran. In late May, Condoleezza Rice announced an about- face on U.S. policy toward the pariah state. With Washington signaling that it was ready to engage, Iran seemed on a path to eventually negotiating an understanding with the West, perhaps exchanging its nuclear program for some level of international acceptance. The deal would almost certainly have delivered what Iran has long coveted: widely acknowledged status as a regional power. But, whereas Iran was operating from a position of strength just one month ago, it now looks weaker by the day. It does not much matter whether Tehran seriously miscalculated by ordering Hezbollah to instigate this war or whether Hezbollah acted unwisely on its own. Either way, the terrorist organization that serves as an extension of Iranian power in the western Middle East is now in danger of emerging badly damaged from this conflict, and that is troublesome news for Tehran. Fortunately, Iran's sudden weakness is Israel's newfound opportunity. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government should seize this moment to do what would have been unthinkable just weeks ago: negotiate with Iran face to face. To understand why Iran might be willing to do this now, you have to understand just how worried it is about losing Hezbollah--or seeing the group's power severely curtailed. For more than 20 years, Hezbollah has produced rich dividends for Iran in return for a relatively modest investment. In its infancy, it more or less singlehandedly chased the United States out of Lebanon by bombing the U.S. Embassy and carrying out an attack that killed 241 American troops. During the 1980s, Hezbollah kidnapped a number of Western citizens and held them for ransom. The negotiations to win their release were torturous, and, at one stage, senior American officials offered to sell arms to Iran as part of the deal. The result was the Iran-Contra scandal. Later, with the help of Iranian intelligence, Hezbollah blew up the Israeli embassy and the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. All these activities--and the publicity that accompanied them--enhanced Hezbollah's prestige, both inside and outside Lebanon. But it was on Lebanon's border with Israel where Hezbollah would truly earn its credentials in the Arab world. Starting in the early '90s, Iran and Syria decided to transform the organization into a highly effective guerrilla force. The group harassed Israeli troops policing the southern Lebanon security zone, and it was able to claim credit for then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak's withdrawal in 2000. Arabs throughout the Middle East greeted this development as the first time an Arab force had used violence to induce a major Israeli pullback from occupied territory. Building on this success, Syria and Iran would go on to arm Hezbollah with more than 10,000 rockets and missiles capable of targeting large areas of northern Israel. And, even as it was transforming into one of the region's most powerful military forces, Hezbollah was also strengthening its political arm by participating in elections: Two ministers in Lebanon's current government are Hezbollah representatives. In sum, Hezbollah is no small achievement for Iran: a highly accomplished Shia guerrilla force flourishing on Lebanese soil, in the heart of the Arab- Sunni Muslim world. It is led by a brilliant political and spiritual leader who defers to Ayatollah Khaminei in Tehran and augmented by an independent Iranian military presence in Lebanon. All of this is cloaked in the legitimacy provided by Hezbollah's democratic participation in Lebanese politics and popularity with segments of the Lebanese people. What more could the mullahs hope for? Actually, things might only have gotten better. The Shia community, which makes up about 40 percent of Lebanon's population, could ultimately have gained control of the country, enabling Iran to establish a forward operational base on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and improve its access to Muslim communities in the Balkans and the sizeable Shia community in Turkey. Until last month, Iran's prospects in Lebanon looked favorable indeed. Now all could be lost overnight. True, as many commentators have pointed out, Hezbollah might emerge strengthened from this conflict. An effective draw in the present hostilities would be perceived in the Middle East as a spectacular success for Hezbollah, and it would contribute greatly to Iranian prestige. The dangers of such an outcome cannot be overstated: Growing self-confidence in Tehran could further encourage Iranian interference in Iraq or even entice the mullahs to reach out to the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia. Most disturbingly, it could jeopardize any chance that the West might convince Iran to suspend its nuclear program. Yet there is good reason to believe that Iran will be weakened by this war. Hezbollah has so far sustained losses far greater than those to which it admits. Its basic infrastructure has been mauled, and it has almost certainly concealed the deaths of senior commanders in the field. Meanwhile, the group has been forced to accept a plan put forward by Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora intended to lead to its eventual disarmament. Its missile launches-- designed to provoke fear in northern Israel--have not weakened the resolve of the Israeli public to see the war through. Nasrallah has acknowledged that morale within his group is suffering. His decision to fire missiles with escalating payloads and greater range deeper and deeper into Israel could be seen as an act of hubris on his part, but I suspect it is instead an act of desperation. Hezbollah's long-range missiles are its weapons of last resort. Once they are launched, and once Israel has withstood them and continued to fight, Nasrallah will have no other cards left to play. All of which explains why Iran, desperate to avoid losing Hezbollah as an effective surrogate, might be willing to sit down with Israel and negotiate. But why should Israel negotiate with Iran? It is true that Israel must be seen to unequivocally defeat Hezbollah on the ground. But such a defeat cannot be made to stick without the true adversary in this conflict accepting the outcome; Hezbollah, after all, is a mere proxy, and its most important decisions are made by others to the east. For one thing, there is the matter of the two kidnapped Israeli soldiers: Israel cannot stop fighting until it has won their freedom, and, if previous experience with Hezbollah and kidnapping is any guide, their release will have to be authorized by Iran. Moreover, any cease-fire that does not include Syria and Iran will not last long. The government of Lebanon can assure Israel that Hezbollah will not be resupplied with weaponry, but such an agreement cannot really be guaranteed without Syrian and Iranian compliance. Thus, negotiation with Syria and--especially--Iran is the only way to achieve the results that Israel needs from this war. To be sure, there are serious barriers to such negotiations. Iran does not recognize Israel's right to exist, and its president has said that the Jewish state must be erased from the map. But, if Iran and Syria do not cooperate, then the conflict will either continue or be briefly postponed to a later date. Tehran and Damascus cannot accept either option. And, for Israel, anything less than clear success on the battlefield accompanied by political negotiations with Iran and Syria will be an exercise in self-delusion. Which is why, in the days to come, Israel would be wise to sit down at the negotiating table and talk to its most bitter enemies. And it would be in the interest of the United States to join them. What would such negotiations look like? The agenda would begin with a focus on peace in southern Lebanon--Iran and Syria would have to agree to restrain Hezbollah, while Israel would promise to cease its attacks--but negotiations need not end there. The elephant in the room is Tehran's nuclear program, and, while that issue would not be resolved immediately, beginning the dialogue is, for now, more important than obtaining quick results. Such talks may sound like an impossibility given the current climate; indeed, it is entirely possible that an outstretched hand from Israel and the United States would be slapped away by Tehran. But, if that happens, then Iran risks embarking along a path that could lead to national disaster. Tehran knows this, so there is a chance it will seize any opportunity to salvage an honorable exit from the situation. Thanks to events in Lebanon, the odds of Iran sitting down at the bargaining table and making major concessions are better now than they have been in a long time.

By efraim halevy