The Trump administration is expected on Wednesday to sign a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia that, per The New York Times, “could lead to the country enriching its own fuel for nuclear reactors” and is estimated to “provide billions of dollars for the U.S. nuclear industry.” This news took much of Washington by surprise, given the rift between the two countries over the U.S. war against Iran. Nuclear experts have long been expecting such a deal, but President Trump’s reported concessions to Saudi Arabia raise legitimate concerns and unless addressed could lead to a Middle East filled with nuclear-weapon programs. This would undermine decades of U.S. work to prevent the spread of the most destructive weapons humanity has ever created.
For the U.S. to sell enriched uranium or nuclear power plants abroad, it must first reach an agreement with the country under article 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The U.S. has 26 of these so-called 123 agreements with 51 governments, including Russia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and the United Arab Emirates. Most of these were negotiated so the U.S. could sell both reactors and low-enriched uranium fuel that cannot be used in nuclear weapons. Almost all of the deals omit permission for states to pursue uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing—thus reducing global risk, as highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium can both be used to produce nuclear weapons. Japan and the European Union, with their strong legal systems and acceptance of the most stringent inspection obligations conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, are the only two 123 deals that allow significant enrichment or reprocessing of U.S. materials.
Saudi Arabia is not Japan or the EU, and its agreement with the U.S. sounds a lot different than the standard 123 deal. As such, it raises concerns that Saudi Arabia is using its close financial ties to the Trump family to manipulate U.S. cooperation to pursue a nuclear weapon option, especially if Iran continues to be a nuclear threshold state.
Of greatest concern is a provision that could open the door to Saudi Arabia having a uranium enrichment facility. The pact reportedly agrees that the two countries will conduct a two-year fuel cycle study on the economic feasibility of domestic enrichment in Saudi Arabia. If the two sides agree that it’s feasible, then the U.S. would build an enrichment facility there without giving Saudi Arabian citizens access to the sensitive technology—a so-called black box approach. If the two sides do not agree enrichment makes sense, then Saudi Arabia would not be allowed to build its own domestic enrichment for 10 years. What happens after that is not clear. The fact that the two-year window would fall within the time remaining in Trump’s term is a sign that the fix for Saudi Arabia might be in and approval of enrichment a foregone conclusion.
Another worrying provision in the deal would “may limit international inspectors from going to any sites in the country that they think could be a pathway to diverting fuel to weapons projects,” the Times reported.
That the U.S. negotiated a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia is not itself a shocking development. The Biden administration held preliminary discussions with Riyadh about a 123 agreement, but with a set of very stringent provisions that are not included in the new deal. The Biden administration’s goal was threefold: improve regional security by facilitating Israeli-Saudi reconciliation, keep China from becoming a major provider of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia and the region, and boost the prospects for U.S. nuclear commercial sales while enhancing nonproliferation goals and standards.
The Biden deal would have required that Saudi Arabia establish full diplomatic relations with Israel, and that Israel agree to make progress on the treatment of Palestinians and on the status of the Occupied Territories in West Bank and Gaza. The Biden concept would also have required Saudi Arabia to agree to only pursue nuclear cooperation with the U.S., cutting out China, Russia, and other states. This clause was driven largely by concern that Beijing or Moscow might not be as careful as the U.S. about sharing sensitive nuclear technology; if the U.S. were the main provider in Saudi Arabia, it could maintain greater control over any nuclear activities the country might want to pursue. (There are reports of an exclusivity clause in a secret side letter to the Trump deal, but that has not been made public.)
Lastly, the Biden deal would have required that Riyadh accept the highest possible standards for nuclear transparency and inspections by the IAEA, including the Additional Protocol accepted by Japan, the EU, the UAE, and even Iran under the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal. If those goals were met, then the Biden administration was willing to consider an option for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to jointly own a uranium enrichment facility under a black box arrangement—with the facility being either in Saudi Arabia, or in the United States with Saudi financing.
Even these conditions raised serious concerns among U.S. nuclear experts. But it was for naught: Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attacks on Israel derailed the discussions.
Now, Trump is on the verge of striking a notably looser, less restrictive deal with Saudi Arabia. There are good reasons to be concerned that the administration has neither the motivation nor the expertise to ensure that any complex nuclear negotiation advances U.S. interests in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The mishandling of nuclear negotiations by the first and second Trump administrations are well documented, including the decision to blow up the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal struck by President Obama and the loose wording of last month’s memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Iran.
Any deal that gives sensitive nuclear technology to a country whose leader has openly stated he would develop a nuclear weapon if Iran did so should raise major concerns—and draw scrutiny by Congress. Under the Atomic Energy Act, nuclear cooperation agreements must be submitted to lawmakers, who then 90 days of “continuous session” to decide whether or not to reject it. If Congress takes no action then the agreement would go into force, and could be ratified by the executive branch. There are not enough in-session days in the current Congress for this deal to be reviewed, which means the next Congress after the midterms will have to consider this deal. As such, there are a number of questions that need to be answered:
- What conditions would be imposed on any future U.S.-Saudi enrichment facility and what happens if Saudi Arabia violates its nuclear nonproliferation obligations?
- Can Saudi Arabia pursue enrichment or reprocessing if the fuel cycle study is inconclusive or determines domestic fuel cycle activities are not economically justified?
- Can Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear or other sensitive technology from China or other states?
- Does pursuing this deal reduce or eliminate America’s ability to encourage future diplomatic engagement between Israel and Saudi Arabia?
In the end, the Trump administration and a GOP-controlled Congress is all but certain to let the proposed agreement enter into force. However, it will take many months for that to happen and many more for any nuclear contracts and deals to be put into place. But now is the time for vigilance. These next few months, between the U.S.-Saudi deal and the Iran war (the country’s 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium is still unaccounted for), may well determine whether the nearly 80-year effort to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading to dozens more countries succeeds or fails.