IranIranIranSenators Clinton, McCain, or Obama all know that the current
policy is not going to prevent Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons. So if they are to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran once
becoming president--something all have committed themselves to trying to assure--they
are going to have to change course, and direct engagement with the Iranians
will be the likely result. Either Clinton or Obama will likely try negotiations
as a primary strategy in order to see if there is a way through incentives and
disincentives to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Even McCain knows that there
is no way he can employ force to set back the Iranian nuclear program without
showing the American public (and the world) that he genuinely tried direct
negotiations to resolve the issue first.
In order to launch such negotiations, the next president will
need to drop the Bush precondition that Iran must first suspend its uranium
enrichment. But since there is a danger that Iran will see this as an admission
of defeat in which America will concede everything sooner or later, the next
president must succeed in increasing economic pressures at the same time. To do
so, and thus prime the ground for negotiations, America
must convince its European allies to adjust their policies as well as strategically
influence less friendly powers like China
and Russia
to fall in line.
America's readiness
to talk to Iran without conditions provides leverage with those who want it
to join the negotiations with the Iranians. In particular, the Europeans have
been convinced, rightly or wrongly, that a deal with the Iranians on the
nuclear issue is possible, but only if the United States is also at the table. It
is the United States, they believe, that can provide what the Iranians most
want in terms of full acceptance of the regime, security assurances, and an end
to sanctions and calls for economic boycotts. Given this view, the next
administration must go quietly to the British, French and Germans and make
clear that while it is ready to drop the precondition on Iranian suspension of
enrichment, join the talks directly, and put a credible comprehensive proposal
on the table, it cannot do so until they agree to ratchet up the pressure on Iran at the
same time. Europeans would thus need to agree on E.U.–wide sanctions that cut off
investment in the Iranian oil and natural gas sectors, commerce with Iranian
banks, and all credit guarantees to their companies doing business in Iran.
Many Europeans would find this difficult to do, especially
given concerns that the Chinese and Russians would simply take their place in Iran. That
argues not for relaxing what the next administration asks of the EU, but for also
doing parallel preparation with the Chinese, Russians, and Saudis prior to
entering negotiations with the Iranians.