And so it follows that Musa
Hilal has been appointed to an important position within the Khartoum regime.
Hilal now serves as senior advisor to the Ministry of
Federal Affairs, which coordinates the regime’s relations with outlying regions
of Sudan as well as with the country’s myriad tribal groups. It works closely
with the Interior Ministry to guide most of the government's major economic and
military decisions. The position is designed to help Hilal consolidate
his authority throughout Darfur, allowing him to wield the power of Khartoum in
controlling the decisions by, and incentives for, Arab groups contemplating
joining--or defecting--from Khartoum’s counter-insurgency campaign. While he
holds this position, he is still subject to U.N. sanctions for his previous
atrocities and will very likely be charged with numerous crimes against
humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC) when its prosecutors
announce their next set of indictments in the coming weeks.
Why
would Khartoum make an appointment guaranteed to incense the international
community, however impotent that ire may prove to be? There can hardly be any
doubt that the regime takes grim pleasure in offending Western human rights
sensibilities. Take the example of Ahmed Haroun, the former State Minister of
the Interior. Since being indicted by the ICC for numerous crimes against
humanity in Darfur--including publicly directing the Janjaweed to “kill the Fur” tribespeople
in the ravaged Mukjar area of West Darfur--he has served as the State Minister
of Humanitarian Affairs; sits on a Khartoum-appointed commission to investigate
human rights abuses in Darfur; and functions as the regime’s liaison with the
UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). It is difficult to say which of
these appointments is the most grotesquely ironic.
But Hilal's appointment is more about Khartoum's
internal strategy than it is a jab at the sensitivities of the international
community. In a critical development over the past year, Arab tribal
groups--even those such as the Mahamid clan to which Hilal belongs--have become
deeply disaffected with the Khartoum regime. Many Arab tribal groups, though a
minority in Darfur, have provided soldiers for Khartoum’s genocidal violence.
They have been paid primarily in the form of booty from villages they have
destroyed, and have counted on the “changed demography” that Hilal encouraged
as a way of sustaining their nomadic way of life. But Arab groups are
increasingly feeling that they have been betrayed by Khartoum--in particular,
that the land they have been promised has gone to too few. The vast majority of
African villages have been destroyed, and there is little left to loot. So,
while the majority of Arab groups have attempted to stay neutral in the
conflict, all now suffer from the consequences of the scorched-earth policies
that have been central to the regime’s tactics in confronting the rebellion.
As a consequence, some Janjaweed have simply left the
genocidal campaign, attempting to resume their former lives or make their way
as bandits; others have actively switched their support to the rebel groups. It
was precisely to stanch these losses that Hilal was appointed. Khartoum well
knows that if their Arab militia allies continue to changes sides--and they
give strong evidence of doing so--then military control of any but the major
towns of Darfur will be impossible. To Khartoum, the situation is a military
problem, so they have appointed a military man to solve it.
Armed
struggle, however, may not be the most pressing concern for civilian Darfuris.
This fall, the harvests across Darfur were disastrous, and as the broader
agricultural economy continues its collapse, markets that once thrived and
defined the economic geography of Darfur no longer exist; the traditional
opportunities for bartering and trade have been largely lost. A way of life
that was in key respects symbiotic has been destroyed. Tens of thousands of
displaced Africans from Darfur are predicted to migrate to camps for displaced
persons in the coming months--not for security, as has been the case, but for
food. Many within the nomadic Arab populations will inevitably follow.
To
be sure, there may be little reason to believe that Hilal will be able to re-enlist
the support of the Arab tribes who have made up the Janjaweed militias. In
fact, the Northern Rizeigat, to which Hilal’s Mahamid belong, have little
influence among Arab groups in southern Darfur, with which they have clashed
violently in recent months. So Hilal constitutes Khartoum’s bid for a kind of
savage insurance policy on the success of its genocide.
Though the appointment of a war criminal like Hilal to
serve as the regime’s liaison with the various populations of Darfur is
certainly reprehensible, the decision is more significant as an illustration of
how viciously desperate the regime’s grip on power has become. Khartoum is
frantically trying to undermine UNAMID's efforts to bring humanitarian aid and
restore peace in Darfur. Hilal--the most ruthless and powerful of their Arab militia
allies in Darfur, the most skilful in mobilizing Arab support for Khartoum’s
genocidal endeavor--is one of the last cards they have left. At the same time,
domestic political pressure on Khartoum appears to be rising in all quarters.
The appointment of Hilal is part of the regime's last desperate attempt to
complete the Darfur genocide before domestic and international pressures have
any chance to bring about regime change.
Eric Reeves is a professor of English Language and Literature at Smith College and has written extensively on Sudan.