Nor have the politics of the issue changed in a way that will have a big effect on U.S. strategy. Before the NIE was released, there was some public support for near-term military action, mostly because of statements from the administration. President Bush’s warning of "World War III" was the most prominent. Vice President Cheney’s claim aboard an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf last May that “with two carrier strike groups in the Gulf, we're sending clear messages to friends and adversaries alike” added fuel to the fire. As I was interviewed on radio programs around the country this week, it became clear to me that many people had been convinced that a military strike was a real near-term possibility. That said, there has always been little policy justification or real possibility of an attack, and--again, drawing from my conversations over the last few days--the NIE has sapped much of whatever enthusiasm existed amongst the public for a military strike. (Most nuclear experts in Washington saw the administration’s threats as primarily aimed at convincing its Security Council partners to step up pressure against Iran, lest the United States take aggressive action.) Since bombing was already unlikely even when it was more politically palatable, the NIE will have little effect on the actual course the administration takes.On the international scene, most of the status quo is also likely to persist. Russia and China were already averse to substantially stronger sanctions, and there is certainly nothing in the new intelligence that will change their minds. The NIE may provide them with new rhetorical ammunition--if there is no weapons program, they say, there is no need for tougher sanctions--but that will not translate into new leverage for their position unless the Europeans independently and substantially alter their approaches, too. Here the changes will be greater than elsewhere, but they will be less than most suppose. Europe, led by France and Britain, has long been focused on Iran’s uranium enrichment program. And unlike its new assessment of Iran’s dedicated military efforts, the NIE findings on the enrichment program are largely unchanged from the past. Iran is still expected to have the ability to make nuclear materials for a weapon some time between 2010 and 2015, and, as a result, the basic European assessment of the threat should remain steady. Its accompanying policy stance, as a result, is unlikely to shift substantially, as recent statements about the need for more sanctions indicates. The NIE will almost certainly have a bigger effect on public attitudes in Europe than it will on strategists’ calculations, but with worries about sanctions leading down a slippery slope to war now less salient, public pressure will have at most a marginal effect on Europeans’ basic approach. On top of that, an acrimonious meeting with the Iranian nuclear negotiator late last week so offended European leaders that the net effect of the past week’s events--that meeting and the new intelligence estimate--may be to harden, rather than soften, the attitude of European diplomats and strategists, at least in Britain and France.And what of Israel? It appears unmoved. While accepting the American judgment that Iran stopped its program in 2003, Israeli officials have been clear that they believe the program has since been restarted. If, at some point, Israel believes that it must eliminate an existential threat, the lack of American appetite for military action may not be able to fundamentally alter its decisions. To be sure, there have been surprising changes in the administration’s nuclear policies in the past. A sudden shift to intensive and constructive engagement with North Korea by the U.S. appears to be paying dividends--and a similar change cannot be ruled out for Iran. But if the administration does, despite all indications, shift strategies, it will be in spite, not because, of the new intelligence findings. The NIE has something in it for everyone. And the Bush administration has found ample support to stay its course.