Of course, Reagan was happy enough to enlarge his coalition
by taking on, and paying lip service to, the culture warriors, right-wing
evangelicals, and neo-conservatives (who were only dimly in evidence as of
1972, or not in evidence at all). He was also happy to consolidate the
Republican white South. So to that limited extent, we can say that Reagan
enlarged on Nixon’s example. But Reagan built a coalition of his own, and
succeeded in 1980 chiefly because of economic and post-Vietnam national
security issues, not the cultural resentments of Nixon’s “silent majority.”
Moreover, in political style as well as ideology, Reaganism
was entirely different from Nixonism. Reagan could be callous and demagogic on
the stump, but nowhere near to the extent Nixon was. Nixon, unlike Reagan,
played political hardball in a paranoid way that turned into lawlessness.
(There was no Donald Segretti or G. Gordon Liddy in Reagan’s entourage; and
while Reagan had his Oliver North--certainly a polarizing figure--North did not
emerge out of Reagan’s quest for the presidency, or for re-election.)
Whereas Nixonism lived on resentments, fear, and even
cynicism, Reaganism was sunny and outwardly open-hearted, blending futurism and
nostalgia in wholly new ways, putting a warm, even sensuous face on right-wing
Republican politics. Reagan’s mean-spirited side did show when it suited his
political purposes (as in his notorious Philadelphia,
Mississippi, “states’ rights”
campaign speech in 1980), and he certainly could be conniving. But that was not
the essence of Reaganism as it was of Nixonism. And it was in Reaganism that
the Republican Party found the means to achieve long-term political dominance,
once Reagan’s pact with George H.W. Bush in 1980 made the GOP Establishment
almost a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Republican Right.