One of the leading voices advocating such a policy reorientation was Sheila Heslin, a deceptively librarian-like National Security Council staffer in her early thirties. Drawing on work she did previously for the World Bank, the tough-minded, bureaucratically wise Heslin argued that Washington’s blanket accommodation of Moscow encouraged just the policies that the United States sought to eradicate—Russia, Heslin argued, would start to shed its authoritarian edge when it was forced to respect its neighbors’ sovereignty, and one way to accomplish that was to strengthen the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. After several months, the Heslin view won the internal policy debate, causing Washington to throw itself behind the construction of huge oil and natural gas pipelines that would provide the Caucasus and Central Asia an independent link to Western markets, unimpeded by Russia. This was a major shift, though at first it went under the radar in the United States. Instead, it was best understood by Turkey, whose paternalistic politicians—many of the region’s states are ethnically Turkic—embraced the Washington initiative in the spirit of comrades-in-arms on a mission to link those states to the NATO bloc. The Clinton Pentagon also opened up military-to-military relations with the region, which became even more important after September 11, as U.S. forces established a presence in three of the five Central Asian republics, including the Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan. These deployments, designed to counter Al Qaeda but which in practice further encroached on Russian influence, angered President Vladimir Putin, who objected bitterly to the continued U.S. military presence along with the sale of U.S. weapons to Georgia. In 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia, shoring up its authority in the near-abroad and sending a message about how strongly the Kremlin rejected the American presence. Yet the Bush administration insisted that the United States was in the region to stay.
The Obama administration, by contrast, has been dialing back on the Great Game. During the Clinton era, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott tried to soothe Russian sensibilities by declaring a “Farewell to Flashman”—Flashman was the scurrilous adventurer who played the Great Game in George MacDonald Fraser's novels—but the Obama administration genuinely means it. There is cooler rhetoric and a return to high-profile cooperation with Russia. Kyrgyzstan is only the latest example of this shift—Obama has also pulled back from a planned deployment of missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, and rejected further talk of re-arming Georgia. “We are not in a competition with any country over influence in Central Asia,” Robert O. Blake Jr., assistant secretary of state for the region, told the Helsinki Commission in Washington this July. “We seek to maintain mature bilateral relations with each country based on our foreign policy goals and each country’s specific characteristics and dynamics.” Russia has taken Blake at his word. In August, Moscow deployed a new missile system in Abkhazia, and earlier it made permanent its military base in South Ossetia, two breakaway Georgian republics that now—though they would strenuously deny it—are effectively Russian vassals.
President Obama's public rationale for this shift is clear. He wants arms control agreements, victory in Afghanistan, and the denuclearization of Iran—and Russia has a role to play in all three. Reset has lubricated new agreements with Russia that enable, for example, the speedy overflight of U.S. military planes across the North Pole and on to Kyrgyzstan, in support of the war in Afghanistan; the sale of Russian military helicopters, to be paid for by the Pentagon, to the Afghan government; and a tighter financial squeeze on Iran. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, absent any other fulfillment of Obama’s campaign vow to win hearts and minds abroad through civility, the "reset" is Exhibit Number One that good manners work.
In addition, Obama officials believe that, while the great-power-rivalry strain of geopolitics in the region may have been necessary in the 1990s, it is now obsolete. When Heslin's policy was initially drawn up, its concrete objective was to provide the Caucasian and Central Asian states with a financial channel independent of Moscow's grip. That meant the construction of energy pipelines to alternative markets, especially the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline from the Caucasus to Turkey. But that policy has largely succeeded: The full flow of oil Baku-Ceyhan began in 2006. The Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are not linked in—and given their cautious nature, they are unlikely to risk Russia’s ire by agreeing to be connected by pipeline with the West—but they have also developed alternate export routes through China, which has constructed its own pipelines that serve precisely the same function.