This is a lightly edited transcript of the November 17 edition of Right Now With Perry Bacon. You can watch the video here or by following this show on YouTube or Substack.
Perry Bacon: This is our show Right Now. I’m joined now by Adam Bonica. He’s a professor of political science at Stanford University. He also writes this excellent Substack and blog called On Data and Democracy, where he like uses data but talks about these sort of core democracy issues that we’re all grappling with.
So Adam, welcome.
Adam Bonica: Oh, thanks. Thanks for having me, Perry.
Bacon: So I wanna start—you wrote a piece a few months ago that I really wanna zone in on, which is basically arguing that there’s… the opportunity for the Democratic Party is to become a party sort of fixated on being the anti-corruption party. So when you say anti-corruption, describe what that means for people, first of all.
Bonica: So that’s a broad set of things that anti-corruption can mean. In the context of what we’re looking at now in American politics, it’s pretty much everything. It’s an like, we’re looking at a administration that Steven Levitsky, who is a very prominent political scientist, is the author of How Democracies Die, has said, you know, the Trump administration is the most basically openly corrupt regime that he has ever seen. And you see this as a through line through pretty much everything we see, especially within the second Trump administration.
Part of the reason that I think this moment points towards the politics of anti-corruption is twofold. One, just sort of having a cursory knowledge of how authoritarian regimes worldwide are successfully challenged. There’s very few examples where anti-corruption was not either the main pillar of the of the anti-authoritarian movement, or at least a very key part of the component. Now, most recently we saw in Nepal a authoritarian regime that was very quickly overthrown and replaced by an anti-corruption crusader. We have tons of other examples throughout history, including in Bangladesh in 2024, Slovakia in 2018, Malaysia, and the one MDB scandal. You know, I could go back and list like 30 different examples.
It’s pretty much, that’s sort of where the starting point is, but it’s also something that’s very much in the DNA of American politics, right? So if you go back to 2006 and the culture of corruption campaign, that was very much an anti-corruption platform that Democrats ran on. In 1994, you could argue what Republicans were doing was an anti-corruption platform, and then going back to Watergate.
So there’s just a lot of empirical evidence backing this idea that anti-corruption is a very powerful force in politics, and I think there’s a lot of evidence in the moment pointing towards a regime being extremely vulnerable to arguments about it being corrupt.
Bacon: You listed a bunch of countries where the authoritarian regime was defeated in part by an anti-corrupt message.
Is that imply that authoritarianism sort of always involves corruption, or is there, is there a sort of a formal tie or a formal study there?
Bonica: Yeah, I see those. Corruption is sort of the Achilles heel of authoritarians and is frequently their downfall, as I pointed out, but they just can’t seem to resist, and it seems to be part of what keeps these regimes together—there’s this notion of you’re in the ingroup, and these ingroup sort of trade with this currency of corruption. You can see all these members of the Trump administration now getting in on the act. I think the, the ProPublica piece about Kristi Noem most recently, but, you know, it’s—we have one or two a week of, you know, Homan or Patel recently, you know, having these examples.
And so you do see these regimes, they almost always have a very strong component of corruption built into them, and it becomes a very huge vulnerability for them politically if it can be exploited by the opposition.
Bacon: So talk about if the Democrats decided to take this advice and to become… what would that look like?
What would a anti-corruption agenda look like?
Bonica: So it could take multiple forms, but the most likely form, I think… I’ll back up a little bit. So what is the thing that’s stopping Democrats from just, you know, putting, like, pushing down the pedal on anti-corruption and polling data shows us that people were pretty, pretty pessimistic about Democrats in terms of like seeing them as corrupt as well.
There was a recent—there was a recent poll by YouGov that asked people whether they thought, like, members of Congress would, like, take bribe, and said, like—it was like 70% of people, around that number, said that yes, like a Democratic member of Congress would be likely to take a bribe. And they said this about, like, specific Democratic and Republican politicians.
So the starting point is people seem to look at American politics and see both parties as similarly corrupt. It’s an interesting observation because it’s very clear that one party is much more openly corrupt than the other. But I think that points to, okay, so what might be driving what would seem like a false equivalence, but one that may have some, like, footing in an actual, like, how people, like, see and understand politics.
And I think that’s because of a lot of what we see as, like, legalized corruption. So campaign finance, for instance—it’s hard to really differentiate between, like, a large donor having influence and that not being a type of corruption, even if it’s legal. And I don’t think a lot of voters necessarily make that distinction.
And I don’t think, honestly, that they should. I sort of agree with most voters that even these legalized forms of influence are forms of corruption. And so I would say the way that this would take place is, one, it has to be a focal point, right? Like you have to talk about corruption, but more importantly, for it to really stick, Democrats need to find a way to signal very clearly that they are not corrupt.
They need to take very clear—probably costly—action to show that they are different. They have not done that yet, but that, I think is sort of the crucial step. If they can accomplish that, then they have one of the biggest sort of electoral openings I think any party has seen in our lifetimes.
Bacon: Give me examples of what actions they could take to seem really strongly anti-corrupt.
Bonica: So I’ve been arguing and putting against these sort of plans for how they could think about doing that. One is they need to clean their own house. So when we talk about things that, like, you know, congressional stock trading—people hate that. Voters hate it. There’s no political advantage to supporting it, and no electoral advantage for a party to say, we’re not gonna ban it.
There’ve been efforts, and they have been blocked by leadership within the Democratic Party, right? So, like, that’s an easy example. Democrats just need to come out and say, well, like, we are against this. The whole party is unified against this. And those who don’t, they’re outside of the official platform and so forth.
But how do you sort of get the, like, a broader sort of coalition of anti-corruption to sort of congeal within the Democratic Party? That’s what the leadership is for. And I think the way that Democrats could do this is that they can run on something—you know, you remember, like, going back in 1994, the Contract of America—that was a way for the Republicans at the time to signal that they were different than the entrenched, powerful Democrats.
Now, Democrats have an opportunity to do something like that as well, where they could say, we’re running on—here’s a contract that if we take back office, here are the very concrete things we are going to do. And you can do most of these with just a speaker’s power within Congress—internal rules.
You can do a lot of campaign finance reform by saying members of our own party are going to be required to follow these sets of rules. They’re not allowed to take or fundraise with big donors anymore. They’re not allowed to trade stocks. They’re not allowed to become lobbyists within, you know, like within five years, or meet with them under certain conditions.
And if they do, they lose certain privileges: like, they’re not considered for the committees they want to be on. They lose seniority. These are things that party leaders have done in the past and things that a party leader could do in the future and say, this is our anti-corruption platform.
This is how we’re gonna enforce it, and we’re going to be able to do that by showing that members of Congress that are not going along with it, are actually not fully, in-good-standing members of the caucus.
Bacon: Stock trade banning. You said something about like, becoming a lobbyist is after, they have to sign a pledge that’s sort of after. What else could they do?
Bonica: Campaign finance reform.
Bacon: Campaign finances reform, meaning they won’t take money from billionaires or they won’t take super PAC funding or…
Bonica: Well, I would say, okay, so Democrats would do way better if they just said, we’re done with big money. They don’t need it.
They have plenty of, like the professional class, which has turned very democratic over the last generation, provide more than enough money if they just…
Bacon: We’re done with gig money, meaning we don’t take donations over $2,000.
Bonica: Go back to Citizens United Levels. So I’d say like a hundred thousand dollars, $130,000 is the max any donor can give.
Beyond that, the Democratic Party just refunds it and says, we don’t accept that money. They can’t do that completely, but they could put that as part of what you would expect to do. If they did that, they would still out-fundraise Republicans. And Republicans are extremely dependent now on mega donors, so you could do that.
The other thing is cleaning up the other fundraising sort of environment that I have talked about quite a bit in the facet with sort of the way in which, like, the small-donor and digital fundraising on the Democratic side is really scammy and sleazy, with all these text messages and, like, this whole really, like, bad environment that a lot of candidates actually sort of either tolerate or take part in. The party needs to clean up these, like, very clear signals of we’re not that much better on these issues to actually, you know, make use of this sort of open lane in anti-corruption.
Bacon: So when you say problems, you just don’t, you don’t just mean I am caught on video exchanging government contracts for things. You mean something deeper than…
Bonica: Yeah.
So I think when we think about corruption in sort of a legalistic standpoint, we miss the broader problem, which is you can legalize a lot of corruption. That’s what’s been happening in American politics over the last 50 years. You can see this—this is sort of a through line of, you know, I’ve studied the legal system in the U.S. as sort of this avenue of power for corruption and wealth that’s not accessible to most of the population, but allows hell of wealthy people and corporations to get a lot out of the system that they otherwise wouldn’t be able to. It’s all legal—you know, giving someone… like mega donors are totally legal in how they’re donating money. No one’s saying that people who are giving these donations are, like, are doing anything illegal, but it is corrupt.
And so I just see that as sort of a framework: just because it’s legal doesn’t mean it’s not corrupt. And those are the types of things that I think upset voters more than anything else.
Bacon: Let me ask, like, I guess my worry about this is that we already have polls showing everyone thinks politicians are corrupt.
So are we gonna make that worse if we have every Democrat saying politics is corrupt, or is your point that they will be saying it’s corrupt but also changing it?
Bonica: Yeah, it’s sort of like a coming clean. Parties can reinvent themselves.
And that’s the only real way that parties really spark realignment in American politics. They make conscious decisions, say that we’re gonna move forward in a different way. There’s also, I think, very strong contingents within the Democratic Party that are already very aligned with this and already very upset. They’ve been part of Democratic politics for quite some time.
So, you know, given how bad things are, like, it—I guess it would be sort of like saying we shouldn’t talk about stuff being too expensive because polls say that people are really concerned about affordability. Well, there are, like, a number of polls now that show that corruption shows up higher in terms of people’s concerns about both government and general concerns, and even affordability, which is sort of wild.
Anytime it shows up on a poll, people are… they express a really strong opinion about it. So, again, I think if you were a party that said, look, we see the problem, we see—we have a plan on how to fix it, and we are going to make those costly actions internally. We can’t force Republicans to do it, but we can do it ourselves.
That would be a really strong message.
Bacon: So the barrier to this is probably how do we talk about this? Like Michael Bloomberg probably wants a Democratic party that takes money from billionaires. So is the problem billionaires or sort of the ideology of people like Michael Bloomberg? Are those the same thing, different words?
Bonica: I mean, they’re not exactly the same thing, but they’re clearly overlapping in terms of the problem that the Democratic Party faces. We couldn’t have had a clearer lens to see this through than what we saw in the New York mayoral race, right. So—and Andrew Cuomo was sort of… should have been banned from Democratic politics in the sense that, like, people knew he was corrupt.
In a lot of ways, they knew that his type of politics was sort of toxic to a large percentage of the population. And, Mamdani showed a different sort of face of the Democratic Party. And I don’t know—like, that sort of division… like, if the party was just like, you know, it was sort of its status quo versus reform—like, that was an undercurrent in that election. Cuomo was the status quo candidate, despite being a very weak candidate in every other sort of way you could imagine.
But he got a lot of backing from sort of billionaires within that environment. And so I see that as—there’s a lot more support, money-wise, going towards maintaining the status quo. If you’ve made a billion dollars in the U.S., that means the status quo has been pretty good to you, right? Like, that’s sort of definitional at some point.
And so it is unsurprising to see that people who have done really well under the status quo may be more likely to want to protect it, even if that means supporting candidates that are, I would say, less than optimal in every other way.
Bacon: So I’ll make an editorially comment myself so you don’t have to… you know, is that my sense is, like, you could see this dividing the party—the anti-corruption message—dividing the party along a progressive–centrist lane.
But I don’t… but I would tell you, encourage the audience to look at a man named John Ossoff. The person who sounds most like Adam these days is John Ossoff, who I don’t think of as being particularly progressive or centrist and is in a swing state. But he also is very leaned into these corruption, which tells me that it’s not—this is not just an ideological thing.
There’s more there.
Bonica: Well, absolutely. So this is the sort of secret sauce of anti-corruption politics. It is those coalitions across ideological spectrums. Progressives, yeah they’re going to get on board to with anti-corruption intuitively…
Bacon: More supportive.
Bonica: Yeah. But there’s, you know… but so are centrists, so are a lot of disaffected conservatives, and most importantly, so are a lot of people who have sort of checked out of politics ’cause they think both parties are corrupt.
That’s actually what we see very consistently with anti-corruption movements that are challenging authoritarians worldwide. Part of the reason they succeed is because they sort of move away from the traditional, like, here’s, like, you know, left–right politics in America, and say, no, we’re actually gonna open up a new front.
And we’re gonna—and it’s gonna be inviting to anyone who cares about having good government, who cares about not being ripped off by your politicians. These are very easy messages, and they’re not messages that are ideological in the sense that we’ve come to think of ideology in U.S. politics. They’re about fairness.
Bacon: Let me, I’m gonna use just a little bit rapid by here. I want to compare anti-corruption to four other frames of what the Democratic party should do. So give sort of short answer to what they should do. Can abundance fit into anti-corruption?
Bonica: Absolutely. There’s no inconsistency between them.
Bacon: Can fighting oligarchy fit into it?
Bonica: Yeah. Yeah. So it would have to.
Bacon: Can affordability fit into this?
Bonica: Yes. Corruption is also about inequality.
Bacon: And can, affordability… okay. I’ve seemed to have forgotten my other one, so I’m gonna have to let it go, but affordability is a big frame you’re hearing.
Oh, popularism. Can it fit into that one? You know, that’s the sort of hard-to-define thing, but can it—but it is popular, I guess.
Bonica: Well, I mean, it is—popularism is about looking at what voters are telling us and what they want, they want. More than anything else, according to polls. So it would… you would have to argue pretty hard against what voters want in polls to say that popularism wouldn’t fit into that as well.
Bacon: Alright. So again, you’ve given a theory that’s hard to disagree with right now. So what should the next steps be for the Democratic party and also for those of us who are not sort of Democratic party leaders and those of us who are just sort of regular citizens, if we could believe in this idea, how do we propagate this further?
Bonica: So I’ve been thinking… Let me just step back a bit. So the leadership has a different like challenge than the population. The population seems to like in the public and, and voters and people who are engaged, and progressive and democratic politics all seem to be pretty aligned that this regime is corrupt.
Bacon: Yeah.
Bonica: Where the challenge is, is how do we coordinate that to turn it into an effective electoral opposition. That’s the challenge for 2026. Beyond that, the other thing about anti-corruption politics is it doesn’t stop at the ballot box—that even if we face a, hopefully not, a type of election that is unwinnable for Democrats, which authoritarians often try to push towards.
That is often their goal: to make sure that elections are still held, but they’re not actually competitive in a way that’s winnable by the opposition party. If we find ourselves in that situation, anti-corruption becomes a mass movement. It’s usually… a key component of mass protests. Some of the most famous examples would be the Philippines and the people-powered revolution.
But right now we see in Serbia, for example, a large mass anti-corruption protest movement. And so I would say for the party, the challenge is they need to coordinate, they need to create a message, they need to actually coalesce that energy in something that’s gonna be electorally advantageous—which they can do—but they just need to make sure that they do it in a way that isn’t undermined by their own people’s own sense of their corruption.
Right? So they need to really clean house to do that. For voters, they just need to know that that’s an avenue. I think, you know, if you go to the No Kings protest, there’s lots of people with signs that hit on issues of anti-corruption. It’s very much within that movement already.
Bacon: One thing I want to emphasize here is you’ve mentioned a lot of international comparisons.
You wrote a piece earlier in the year that I thought was really great. Adam has a Substack called On Democracy and Data, and you sort of went through a bunch of countries where some head of state had committed some kind of illegal act, and then the country had not only thrown that person out of power but also sort of banned them from being in power again. You get this long list of—it’s not just Brazil—you got a long list of examples.
And I think it went to this interesting point, which is, like, we in the U.S. often treat, you know, we are democracy and we are special, and no other country’s ever tried democracy. And, you know, there was a whole rhetoric from—not the right, from the left—on, you know, we can’t punish Trump, we can’t ban him.
That would be taking on one party. So talk about—the example is obvious—so talk about why it’s important for people in the U.S. to look at democracy in other nations and think about what we can learn from, sort of, things abroad…
Bonica: I mean, the simple answer is what we’re facing in the U.S. may feel exceptional to us, but, you know, to my colleagues who study comparative politics…
They look at what’s happening in the U.S., and they’re like, yep, that’s—like, they’re checking off boxes. They… they’ve seen this before. Other countries have been through this. And we have lots of examples of countries that have successfully navigated this and pulled off what’s called an autocratic U-turn, where things had trended in a really negative, anti-democratic way but then reversed.
And so one of the reasons is because we have lots of other countries that have done the hard work to face off against authoritarian politics and have succeeded. And so we really should not discount that. The other thing is that the U.S. has been quite exceptional relative to pretty much any other democracy in how we’ve treated the powerful who have behaved in ways that were anti-democratic. As you mentioned, like, I put together that list—it was 34 different… 34 prime ministers and presidents, countries—and this was only in the last 20 years. Like, there would be a much longer list. And so I just compiled a list of all these examples of the… these national-level leaders who had been convicted of a crime and what was the consequence.
And in every single example, except for the U.S., which was the sole exception, the offending leader was either banned from running for office or imprisoned. The U.S. was the only place where that didn’t happen. And, to be honest, if you look at the crimes that were committed by other leaders, Trump had done every single one of them, and for the most part in a much more intense fashion.
And so this whole, like, hemming and hawing we saw—it was, I think, it goes back to this notion of, like, there is this sort of elite protection norm within American politics, this idea that it was going to be too polarizing to go after a leader for the criminal acts and anti-democratic acts that Trump had committed out in the open.
And the idea that, oh, it’s gonna, you know, pull the party apart—well, every single country where you see that happen, the leader who’s accused always says it’s a political attack.
But the response is what matters. Like, you have to hold the powerful accountable.
And that’s, like, one… that’s sort of maybe the key example showing, like, wow, the U.S. really should have looked at what other countries were doing when we were navigating that moment. The right thing to do was to move swiftly, to bring—bring, like… so early on in the Biden administration. Had that been a priority, and it should have been a priority, we would’ve had it. We would’ve just been one of 35 countries who had done that, not the one country who didn’t.
Bacon: Let me finish on two subjects. The first is you and Jacob Grumbach, great political scientist at Berkeley, wrote a piece that got published in The Public a couple days ago arguing that Gen Z is actually very progressive, or the most progressive generation of the generations we have, on racial issues.
And this idea that there’s a bunch of Joe Rogans is… let me ask this. First of all, we saw this drop in youth—in the youth vote for Democrats from 2020 to 2024 that led to all this, you know, the young white… young Gen Z men, white and non-white, are sort of—are sort of Joe Rogan devotees.
What did you make of that drop, and what do you—who explains that drop to you?
Bonica: A drop? So from what I can see in the data, that drop was largely a function of turnout dynamics. We saw a much bigger drop among, say, registered Democrats and also registered independents that are very likely Democrats who didn’t vote in 2024, that would’ve voted or did vote in 2020. That’s… and Republicans saw no commensurate drop in that generation. So, like, often what we interpret as these electoral swings really are just who’s turning out to vote. And you can predict a lot of political, like, election outcomes just based off of these turnout dynamics without having a single person switch or switch to vote. And so that’s, you know, that’s how I interpret largely there. You know, there is something odd going on among some… something different happening among a subset of young men. And so I think that’s also something that we need to recognize.
But as a group, this notion that Gen Z has just done this U-turn—from going from being the most progressive and most Democratic generation that we had seen, to all of a sudden the one that was the most Republican and conservative—that just doesn’t add up.
It also didn’t show up in the actual exit polls of the data. It was just sort of a narrative that emerged. And I think that the, like, a more sort of data-driven look at what Gen Z believes and what they want out of politics points to… in a very different direction.
Bacon: And let me close. You’ve been a part of this big debate about moderation and, like, there’s… a term called war that I don’t remember.
But anyway, the details about—well, let’s come to… so I think the core thing that I wanna ask you about then is, like, I guess even I have, who’s someone who’s probably left ideologically in a way most people aren’t, have always assumed this sort of… the most—you know, there’s a lot to be gained by being the most centrist candidate.
I may disagree with Joe Manchin on policy, but if we ran Joe Manchin everywhere, that would win most of the most seats. And that’d be great. And I think your data is… what you’re arguing is that maybe that was true in 1992, but we’ve had a change. Is that the benefits of moderation have went from pretty big to—is that the right… have went from sizable to almost zero? Explain what the argument is here.
Bonica: The core of the argument is actually partisanship has just become so dominant in American politics that it’s near impossible to truly outrun your party. So… and what that means is that if someone shows up to vote and they’re voting up and down the ballot, if that person’s voting for the presidential Democratic ticket, they’re probably gonna vote for everyone down-ballot Democrat.
That’s just—that’s how things work these days. That wasn’t true back in the eighties, right? There was a lot more ideological overlap between parties. There were liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats, and so you saw a lot more opportunities for someone to outrun their party. The crux of the argument is, you know…
I have, you know, millions and millions of data points—political scientists have been studying this for, for generations now. And, you know, unlike physics, in political science you don’t find laws of the universe that hold forever, right? Like, you have to continually check them to see if they’re still applicable to the political environment. The median voter theorem, which is this notion that if you move to the center you do better in politics, has two sort of important caveats to it. One, people can’t be pure partisans—which now, we’re in a moment where that is true for the most part. And two, turnout has to remain fixed, right? So a lot of what, you know, even those theories… you go back and you read the early political science on it.
The median voter theorem didn’t even survive the original book that it was developed in—the Downsiean theory of voting—because he came to this conclusion: well, if turnout changes, then the median voter isn’t a fixed position. That’s a lot of what we’re seeing. The whole sort of wave-cycle pattern that we see is this pattern of… if the turnout, like, surges on the Democratic side and doesn’t on the Republican side, you see a wave election, and you see all these swing districts swinging one way or another.
That wouldn’t happen in a world where voters were voting on individual candidates and not on parties. I mean, the bigger issue is, like, this whole debate has ignored the last 30 years of very rigorous political science research on this question, and that, I think, was one of the more frustrating aspects of it, because political scientists have found consistently over the last decade or two that this—this effect—was really small.
There is still a small persuasion effect for moderation, right? Like, you can do a little bit better in your district relative to your party, but for a major ideological shift—moving from, say, like, the center of the party to where Joe Manchin is—you can expect to get about half a percentage point in vote share.
So how many districts would that swing? Well, zero. It’s like… and all the districts that we have that were swing districts in 2024 had moderates running in them anyway. And so this strategy—the problem with it is, as a party strategy, it’s tapped out. There are no gains left to be had.
And those gains that would be had if you had a bunch of progressive, perhaps, running in those districts are just not… like… there—they would be small anyway. So I think that’s sort of what’s frustrating about that debate, that it’s trying to give this sort of party-wide strategy over to this tactic that just… there’s really not much to be gained from it.
Bacon: Let me play this out a little bit. Alright, so, if we wanted to see the Democrats win a stable Senate or a Senate majority, if we wanna see the Democrats win Ohio and Iowa, let’s say, it’s likely that they’re going to win that only if they’re fairly close in the presidential. Part of what you’re saying is…
If they lose the presidential by 40 points, they’re not gonna have this magic candidate who breaks from the party by 12. And I think you’re also saying that the path to Democrats getting 52% nationally is probably not—and also in Ohio—is probably not moderation Bill Clinton–style, because they’ve been doing that.
It hasn’t worked. It might… in other words, the anti-corruption thing is at least something maybe they haven’t tried already as a way to get to a bigger national majority.
Bonica: Yeah. So, I think what they… my sort of view on this is anti-corruption has huge upsides, electorally if done right, the types of upsides that could really upend, sort of the way we’ve seen this ossified politics take place.
Bacon: It could be a realignment, so to speak.
Bonica: Yeah. And realignment for decisions. You know, the New Deal realignment—there are things that happen when parties have openings and they make the decision to take them. Like, the New Deal realignment in the thirties was a deliberate response by the Democratic Party and FDR to deal with it in a different way.
It was a—at the time—seen as a risky prospect, but one that paid off enormously. The Southern realignment, the most recent major realignment we’ve seen, was a deliberate set of decisions by Democratic leadership about civil rights and a Republican response to go from the party of Lincoln to the party of Southern racism in a sense.
This is something that a part… a party needs to decide to do. The realignment isn’t just something you wait for—you wait for the opportunity, and then you take advantage of it. I see anti-corruption as this very open lane for that type of realignment that has the distinctive advantage of you don’t upset anyone in your existing coalitions other than a few powerful politicians who you don’t need anyway.
Bacon: Adam, this was a great conversation. I’m gonna end it there. Thank you for joining us. I urge everybody to look at Adam’s Substack On Data and Democracy because he’s got some really great work that is essential understanding politics there.
He also, like, with Jacob Grumbach, has a piece on the New Republic website about young voters not being as conservative as claimed. So, Adam, thanks for joining us.
Bonica: Thanks for having me.
