Kevin Drum is skeptical that the Obama administration would really be within its rights to ignore the debt ceiling:
Maybe I'm missing something here, but it strikes me that this doesn't come close to implying that the debt ceiling is unconstitutional. What it really suggests is merely that the public debt is the only untouchable part of the federal budget.
Jack Balkin delves into the legislative history and shows why the 14th Amendment has a provision guaranteeing the debt in the first place. the sponsor of the provision, Benjamin Wade, wrote at the time:
[The proposed amendment] puts the debt incurred in the civil war on our part under the guardianship of the Constitution of the United States, so that a Congress cannot repudiate it. I believe that to do this wil give great confidence to capitalists and will be of incalculable pecuniary benefit to the United States, for I have no doubt that every man who has property in the public funds will feel safer when he sees that the national debt is withdrawn from the power of a Congress to repudiate it and placed under the guardianship of the Constitution than he would feel if it were left at loose ends and subject to the varying majorities which may arise in Congress.
If Wade's speech offers the central rationale for Section Four, the goal was to remove threats of default on federal debts from partisan struggle. Reconstruction Republicans feared that Democrats, once admitted to Congress would use their majorities to default on obligations they did disliked politically. More generally, as Wade explained, "every man who has property in the public funds will feel safer when he sees that the national debt is withdrawn from the power of a Congress to repudiate it and placed under the guardianship of the Constitution than he would feel if it were left at loose ends and subject to the varying majorities which may arise in Congress."
Like most inquiries into original understanding, this one does not resolve many of the most interesting questions. What it does suggest is an important structural principle. The threat of defaulting on government obligations is a powerful weapon, especially in a complex, interconnected world economy. Devoted partisans can use it to disrupt government, to roil ordinary politics, to undermine policies they do not like, even to seek political revenge. Section Four was placed in the Constitution to remove this weapon from ordinary politics.
In other words, it's in the 14th Amendment to guard against exactly what Congressional Republicans are doing right now.
Balkin does not suggest, nor do I, that the legal merits are open and shut. It's certainly risky to take a flyer in the middle of a debt crisis. But if we do reach h-hour, we're probably better off if the Treasury simply announces it's going to continue to pay the bills and dares Republicans to take them to court than repudiating the debt, right?
Matt Steinglass argues that the Supreme Court would likely side with the Treasury:
If there's one thing we've learned in the past 11 years, it is that the Supreme Court's decisions on critical issues are very strongly influenced by political pressure. In a situation where the entire weight of world bond markets was bearing down on Anthony Kennedy's head, would he really vote to crash the economy and destroy the credit rating of the United States? Would any individual do that? I don't think even Eric Cantor would, if he were solely and publicly responsible for the decision. The ability of the GOP to push the government to the brink of default, and possibly ultimately over it, depends on the diffusion of responsibility: Republicans can only do it because they can hold Democrats to blame. It's also driven by political vulnerability: Republicans have gotten themselves into a spiraling tea-party-driven political dynamic where they seem, on issue after issue, to be incapable of voting for any proposals that a Democrat might be able to accept, for fear of the consequences from their base. Anthony Kennedy does not have to fear a primary challenge, and if the United States' ability to pay its debts comes down to his single vote, he'll have no excuse. Maybe I have no idea how these things work. But I can't see a Republican Supreme Court going toe to toe with the entire massed forces of Wall Street and not blinking.
A point that I think is worth drawing out here is that it's not even clear the GOP leadership wants the power to take the credit of the Treasury hostage, or -- more likely -- if it's simply been forced into this position by a financially uneducated base. Republicans in Congress might be relieved to have a deux ex machina absolve them of the need to walk a fine line between the demands of the base and the demands of their business constituency.